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An Empirical Study of Amicus Curiae in Federal Court:
A Fine Balance of Access, Efficiency, and Adversarialism
Linda Sandstrom Simard1

Abstract
During a recent telephone conversation, a colleague and I discussed whether the United
States Supreme Court bears some resemblance to a quasi administrative agency. Of
course, the Supreme Court is an Article III court, not an administrative agency. Yet, in
more than 50% of the cases on the Court=s docket, non parties are permitted to offer legal
and/or factual information to supplement the legal and factual arguments made by the
parties to the suit. Such non party participants, commonly referred to as amicus curiae B
or Afriends of the court,@ frequently raise new arguments that are totally absent from the
parties= briefs. Moreover, the procedural requirements for permission to participate as an
amicus are very lenient B at times virtually non existent. The Court=s willingness to allow
such non party participation and consider the information offered by such participants is
more akin to the notice and comment period of administrative rule making than the party
controlled adversarial model which we typically consider essential to our judicial system.
This article considers why the system allows amicus curiae this privileged position and
whether we should be rethinking the procedural mechanisms which apply to friend of the
court briefs.
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Associate Dean and Professor of Law, Suffolk University Law School. I would like to
thank Judge William G. Young for his helpful comments and Ellen Delaney, Reference
Librarian, for her tremendous help in finding me resources on empirical research methodology.
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I. Introduction
It has long been accepted procedure for amicus curiae to offer legal and factual insights
that facilitate the court=s decision making process. One of the more famous examples of the
Court=s willingness to accept such data is found in Muller v. Oregon, in which the Court upheld
the constitutionality of a state law limiting the number of hours that female employees could
work. In that case, Louis Brandeis, serving as counsel for the State of Oregon, filed a brief
containing social science data regarding the detrimental effects of long work hours on women=s
health and asserting that the law at issue was necessary to protect women=s health and safety.2
The unanimous Court accepted the brief, notwithstanding the fact that it contained reports and
data that were not part of the appellate record, and noted that the information showed Aa
widespread belief that woman=s physical structure, and the functions she performs in
consequence thereof, justify special legislation.@3 Amicus briefs have proven important in many
other landmark cases declaring social policy, including Brown v. Board of Education in which
the Court cited information offered by amici that segregation generates a feeling of inferiority
2

Brief filed by Louis Brandeis at 11, Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908)(no.107); see
also, Martha Davis, International Human Rights and United States Law: Predictions of a
Courtwatcher, 64 Albany L. Rev. 417, 423 (2000)(Brandeis= brief was prepared largely by two
activists, Florence Kelley and Josephine Goldmark, who collected data on women=s work
experiences).
3

Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. at 420-21 (AConstitutional questions, it is true, are not
settled by even a consensus of present public opinion, for it is the peculiar value of a written
constitution that it places in unchanging form limitations upon legislative action, and thus gives a
permanence and stability to popular government which otherwise would be lacking. At the same
time, when a question of fact is debated and debatable, and the extent to which a special
constitutional limitation goes is affected by the truth in respect to that fact, a widespread and
long continued belief concerning it is worthy of consideration. We take judicial cognizance of all
matters of general knowledge.@)

2

among persons of color4 and Roe v. Wade in which the Court relied upon information supplied
by amici describing the risks of abortion and recounting beliefs concerning the beginning of
life.5
Although non party participation by amicus curiae has been acceptable procedure in
federal courts for quite some time, there has been a tremendous surge in amicus activity over
recent decades. In fact, during the last half of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court saw an
astonishing 800% increase in the number of amicus filings on its docket.6 This increase
manifested as an increase in the number of briefs filed as well as an increase in the number of
participants cosigning the amicus submissions.7 Several scholars have studied this tremendous
surge in nonparty participation and established that the influence of amicus briefs on litigation
success depends upon many factors, including for example the prestige and experience of the
entity filing the brief (with the U.S. Solicitor General showing the greatest success), whether the
brief supports the respondent or the petitioner (briefs supporting the respondents enjoy higher
4

347 U.S. 483 (1954).

5

410 U.S. 113 (1973).

6

Joseph Kearney, Thomas Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on the
Supreme Court, 148 U. Penn. L. Rev. 743, 749 (2000). The federal courts of appeal have also
seen a rise in the number of amicus filings, but a much less dramatic one. See John Harrington,
55 Case Western Reserve 667, 680 (from 1992 through 2002, the number of amicus filings at the
federal courts of appeals increased 14.6%).
7

Paul Collins, Friends of the Court: Examining the Influence of Amicus Curiae
Participation in U.S. Supreme Court Litigation, 38 Law & Society Review 807, 811
(2004)(While a variety of briefs may provide a court with legal and factual insights that are
relevant to the issues in the case, the number of individuals or entities who cosign the brief
merely provides additional endorsement value to the arguments presented therein.) In Webster
v. Reproductive Health Services, 78 amicus briefs were filed (31 for respondents; 47 for
petitioners). Of the more than 400 cosignors on the briefs, 335 filed on behalf of the
respondents, and 85 filed on behalf of the petitioners. Id. at 812.
3

success rates), and the disparity in number of briefs offered for each side (a small number of
briefs for one side with no briefs for the other side, sometimes translates into higher success
rates; but larger disparities do not).8
This surge of amicus activity has given rise to concern among some judges.9 Several
circuit courts have criticized the lack of scrutiny that is common in granting leave to file amicus
briefs and at least one circuit has articulated a policy regarding the limited types of amicus
filings that it will allow.10 In March, 2006, a federal circuit court refused to accept amicus briefs
from three senators, even though none of the parties to the litigation opposed the filing.11
Notwithstanding these concerns, at least one circuit court has expressed support for an open door
model toward granting permission to file amicus briefs, expressly rejecting arguments that amici
must be impartial and not motivated by pecuniary concerns.12

8

See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 6 at 749-750. Overall, the Kearney and Merrill study
found that amicus briefs have a marginal impact on the outcome of litigation. See id. These
statistics, however, may mask the fact that amicus curiae have had a significant effect on
Supreme Court jurisprudence in particular cases, particularly those establishing important public
polciy. See John Harrington, 55 Case Western Reserve 667, 675 (2005)(citing several Supreme
Court cases in which the arguments presented by amicus curiae were cited and relied upon by the
Court). Moreover, amicus curiae filed at the certiorari stage significantly increase the chances of
the Court=s granting the appeal. Harrington, supra note C, at 684.
9

Harrington, 55 Case Western Res. 667, at 670-672.

10

Voices for Choices v. Illinios Bell Telephone Co., 339 F.3d 542 (7th Cir. 2003);
National Organization for Women v. Scheidler, 223 f.3d 615 (7th Cir. 2000); Ryan v. Commodity
Futures Trading Commission, 125 F.3d 1062 (7th Cir. 1997); see also American college of
Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. Thornburgh, 699 F.2d 644 (3rd Cir. 1983).
11

Boumedine v. Bush, docket 05-5062 (D.C. Cir. 2006)(the rejection of the senators=
briefs was noteworthy in part because no other amicus filing in the case was refused).
12

Neonatology Associates v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue Service, 293 F.3d 128
(3rd Cir. 2002).
4

In order to evaluate the varying views on amicus participation, we must consider the
reasons that amicus curiae are seeking to participate in federal litigation in significantly greater
numbers than they did 50 years ago. One important factor appears to be the ripening of the
public law model of litigation. In 1976, Professor Abram Chayes identified an emerging model
of public law litigation which focused on the vindication of constitutional or statutory policies
rather than on private disputes. 13 He predicted that this model would lead to a significant power
shift in favor of the judicial branch and would become a formidable tool in the public policy
debate. Thirty plus years later, it is fair to say that his prediction has been realized. Public law
litigation has responded to the most controversial social and political issues of our day -including racial discrimination, affirmative action, abortion, free speech, church-state relations,
and right-to-die cases, just to name a few B and amicus curiae have been actively involved every
step of the way.14 The continuing relevance of public law litigation in the twenty first century is
evidenced by many recent events, including the Supreme Court=s decision in Hamden v.
Rumsfeld declaring constitutional limits of executive power in wartime, the Court=s controversial
eminent domain decision in Kelo v. City of New London,15 and even by the confirmation
hearings for Supreme Court Justices Roberts and Alito during which many Senators attempted to
prognosticate whether a change in the composition of the Court would lead to a new
interpretation of the right of privacy under the United States Constitution. These examples, and

13

Abarm Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1281

14

The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on the Supreme Court, 148 U. Penn. L. Rev. at

15

125 S.Ct. 2655 (2006).

(1976).
755.

5

countless others, illustrate that public law litigation has played, and likely will continue to play, a
significant role in driving the public policy debate.
The emergence of the public law model and its maturation over the latter half of the
twentieth century, created a ripe environment for interested non parties to weigh in on the
development of policy through the courts and the amicus brief provided the tool to accomplish
this goal.

Insights offered by amicus curiae tend to extend beyond the interests of the parties to

the litigation B who are presumably adequately represented by their own lawyers B and are
generally aimed at protecting the interests of individuals or organizations who are absent from
the proceedings but whose interests are potentially jeopardized by the litigation. Given that
public law litigation inherently extends beyond the specific interests of the parties to the
litigation and prospectively changes widely applicable public policies, the amicus brief has
provided a powerful tool for nonparty participation in public law litigation affecting the body
politic.
If one considers the development of public law litigation as the fuel for the fire which
ignited the amicus curiae blaze, the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure played little or no role in controlling the flame.16 Unlike traditional litigants who are
16

See The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on the Supreme Court, 148 U. Penn. 743,
761 (AThe Court=s current practice in argued cases is to grant nearly all motions for leave to file
as amicus curiae when consent is denied by a party. Because the Court in recent years has
routinely granted such motions, parties that are represented by experienced lawyers will in most
cases consent to such filings, if only to avoid burdening the court with the need to rule on the
motion. The effect of the Court=s liberality in ruling on motions for leave to file, therefore, is to
permit essentially unlimited filings of amicus briefs in argued cases.@)
Of the almost fifty amicus briefs filed in Hamden v. Rumsfeld, the only amicus brief that
the Supreme Court refused to accept was one that was filed out of time. (Motion for leave to file
amicus brief out of time filed by Scott L. Fenstermaker, Denied, Mar. 20, 2006).
6

subject to the procedural rules which protect the fundamental values of our adversary system,
amicus curiae are excused from the requirements of most procedural rules because they are
deemed non parties. Specifically, traditional litigants must meet the requirements of
justiciability and subject matter jurisdiction, both of which have constitutional underpinnings
that define the judicial power and protect the constitutional separation of powers; amicus curiae
need not meet the requirements of justiciability or subject matter jurisdiction. Traditional
litigants must satisfy the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for joinder of parties and claims, rules
which protect the fair and efficient administration of the courts and define the scope of the
Aclaim@; amicus curiae need not satisfy the rules for joinder because they are not Ajoining@ the
litigation as a party. Traditional litigants must garner and present evidence which satisfies the
Federal Rules of Evidence, rules which attempt to protect the reliability of the evidence; amicus
curiae are allowed to present some types of factual information without regard to the
requirements of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Finally, traditional litigants are limited by the
rules of res judicata and collateral estoppel from endlessly relitigating the same issues, rules
which are based upon efficiency and credibility of the system; amicus curiae are not limited by
the rules of res judicata or collateral estoppel.
In this article, I will analyze the role of amicus curiae in modern federal litigation. First,
I will consider the historical development of the tool from its inception to the present as a means
to understand the foundation upon which the current treatment rests. Second, I will analyze
empirical data collected through a nationwide survey of federal judges to determine when amicus
participation is most (and least) helpful to the bench. Third, relying upon the historical and
empirical information, I will evaluate whether the relatively recent surge in amicus activity is a

7

serious incursion on the values of our adversary system, and whether prospectively we should
consider a method for more vigilant policing of the amicus process.

II. Historical Analysis: From Then to Now
A. The Origins of Amicus Curiae
The role of amicus curiae B or Afriend of the court@ B enjoys a rich pedigree.17 Dating
back to Roman Law, the tool allowed an unbiased or neutral outsider to a legal action to provide
information to an appellate court in a case to which the amicus was not named as a party.18
Relatively loose procedural restrictions created a flexible doctrine that was capable of
responding to a variety of needs.19 For example, amicus curiae frequently provided impartial
guidance on legal issues ranging from oral shepardizing,20 to referencing the existence of a
relevant statute or other source of law.21
Over time, amicus curiae evolved into third party representatives, less concerned with
providing unbiased scholarly guidance to the court and more interested in protecting the interests

17

Samuel Krislov, The Amicus Curiae Brief: From Friendship to Advocacy, 72 Yale L. J.
694, 695 (1962-63); Harper & Etherington, Lobbyists Before the Court, 101 U. Penn. L. Rev.
1172 (1952-53).
18

Arthur Allen Leff, The Leff dictionary of Law: A Fragment, 94 Yale L. J. 1855, 2012

19

Id.

(1983).

20

Holthouse=s Law Dictionary (Awhen a judge is doubtful or mistaken in matter of law, a
bystander may inform the court thereof as amicus curiae. Counsel in court frequently act in this
capacity when they happen to be in possession of a case which the judge has not seen or does not
at the moment remember.@).
21

The Prince=s Case, 8 Coke 1, 29a (1606).
8

of individuals or entities who were not named parties in a suit. This progression from neutral
informant and servant of the court, to defender of third party rights marked a significant shift in
the role of amicus curiae and opened the door for amicus curiae to take sides in a dispute
advocating a particular position.22
The shift away from neutrality and toward advocacy accelerated under the federal system
in the United States. 23 A strict interpretation of federal subject matter jurisdiction and a general
hostility to intervention limited the ability of interested entities to formally participate in
litigation in federal court and encouraged resort to the amicus curiae role.24 Although the
hostility toward intervention eventually softened and courts recognized that it was necessary to
allow bystanders to intervene in a suit to protect their interests,25 amicus curiae continued to
enjoy relatively easy access in federal courts.26
The identity of the amicus curiae also changed. Originally, the role involved a
22

Krislov, supra note 17, at 695. (As noted by Professor Krislov Athe amicus curiae brief
early underwent changes that ultimately were to have profound repercussions. A step had been
taken toward change from neutral friendship to positive advocacy and partisanship.@)
23

The first appearance of amicus curiae in American Jurisprudence occurred in Green v.
Biddle,21 U.S. (8 Wheat) 1 (1823), when the State of Kentucky served as amicus curiae. See
Michael Harris, Amicus Curiae: Friend or Foe? The Limits of Friendship in American
Jurisprudence, 5 Suffolk J. Trial and App. Adv. 1, 4 (2000).
24

Krislov, supra note 17, at 698.

25

Id.

26

Id. at 700. It is important to maintain the distinction between non party amicus curiae
and intervenors. For example, in Florida v. Georgia, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 478 (1854), Chief Justice
Taney suggested in a dissenting opinion that allowing the United States government to
participate in a suit under the guise of amicus curiae status when in fact the government held a
direct and real interest in the outcome of the case, would violate the subject matter jurisdiction
limitations imposed by Article III.
9

professional relationship between the court and the individual amicus curiae (who may or may
not have been a lawyer).27 Organizations could not serve as amicus curiae.28 By the early
1900's, however, courts began to identify an amicus brief according to the organization who
sponsored it rather than according to the individual who drafted it.29 This shift paved the way for
influential groups to weigh in on the merits of a dispute by offering their endorsement to one
litigant=s position over another.30
As a consequence of these doctrinal changes, the amicus brief became a formidable tool
in effectuation of social change through litigation. The Department of Justice was one of the
first entities to effectively invoke the amicus device in pursuit of public policy change and, in the
early part of the 20th century, state attorneys general31 and minority groups recognized the
opportunity to use the tool to shape public policy.32

27

Allison Lucas, Friends of the Court? The Ethics of Amicus Brief Writing in First
Amendment Litigation, 26 Fordham Urb. L. J. 1605, 1607 (1999).
28

Krislov, supra note 17, at 703.

29

Id.

30

Notwithstanding this shift in purpose, courts occasionally refused to accept amicus
briefs on the ground that they were Aexcessively partisan@ or the amicus curiae was Aacting
(though under disguise) not as a friend of the court but as a friend of one of the contestant
litigants before said court@. Id. at 704, 719.
31

Id. at 707. Today, state attorneys general continue to actively participate in the public
policy debate through amicus curiae and other procedural devices. Elliott Spitzer, as New York
State Attorney General, is possibly the most well known activist attorney general, but there are
many others who have orchestrated significant social changes on important issues such as sales
of tobacco products, predatory lending practices, insurance practices, anti competitive practices,
anti-telemarketing policies, and many more. Leonard Post, The National Law Journal, April 13,
2006.
32

Id. at 707. In light of the increased role of litigation to vindicate minority rights, for
example, civil rights organizations such as the ACLU and the American Jewish Congress
10

During the latter half of the 1940s and the early 1950s, the use of the amicus brief
became so prevalent that at least some perceived them to be a Agenuine problem@ to the Supreme
Court.33 Characterized as Arepetitious at best and emotional explosions at worst,@ the value added
by such briefs was far outweighed by the inefficiencies created by them.34 These attempts at
judicial participation created the appearance that the Court was a Apolitical legislative body,
amenable and responsive to mass pressures from any source.@35

In an effort to respond to the

problem, the Court in November 1949 amended its procedural rules regarding non governmental
amicus participation36 to require either consent of all parties or, if consent was not available, a
motion requesting permission to file an amicus brief.37 The rule change resulted in dramatically
fewer amicus briefs reaching the Court.38

became active filers of amicus briefs. Id. at 710.
33

Harper & Etherington, 101 U. Penn. L. Rev. at 1172.

34

Id.

35

Id. The lack of any enforced guidelines regarding judicial participation by non parties
gave rise to judicial lobbying in the form of picketing, post-cards, letters, telegrams and personal
delegations to the Justices. See also, Krislov, 72 yale L. J. at 710.
36

Governmental units were permitted to file amicus briefs as a matter of right both before
and after the rule change.
37

U.S. Sup. Ct. Rule 27-9 (1950). Although the rule which permitted amicus participation
prior to this amendment required consent of the parties to the suit, this requirement was rarely
followed and amicus briefs were routinely accepted without proof of consent.
38

Harper & Etherington, U. Penn. L. Rev. at 1175 (noting that the Court went from Aone
extreme to the other@ with regard to the acceptance of amicus participation); Krislov, 72 Yale L.
J. at 713 (A[T]he Court=s reaction to applications to file without consent of the parties: >Such
motions are not favored.=@).
In the years following the promulgation of the new rule, the Court rejected amicus filings
offered without consent in 39 instances and granted permission to such filings in only 12
instances. Krislov, supra note 17, at 713-14.
11

During the late 1960s and early 1970s, public law litigation emerged and amicus curiae
participation once again surged.39 For example, from 1965 to 1999 the percent of US Supreme
Court cases which included amicus filings grew from 35% to 95%, and the number of amicus
filings increased by over 800%.40

During the late 1970s and 1980s, some courts began to

expand the traditional role of amicus curiae beyond the mere presentation of information through
written briefs to allow participation in discovery, introduction of evidence, and presentation of
oral arguments.41 Notwithstanding the occasional use of amicus curiae in these roles at the trial
39

Professor Abram Chayes was one of the first scholars to recognize the importance of
the public law model, suggesting that it would in time overshadow the relevance of the
traditional litigation model. He described the traditional litigation model as a party controlled
and party initiated system for resolving disputes by retrospectively evaluating a self contained
episode and responding with the declaration of a compensatory remedy. He contrasted public
law litigation to traditional litigation and noted several significant differences between the two
models. Specifically, he noted that public law litigation tends to be less rigidly bilaterial and
more likely to be structured inclusively by the parties and court; less retrospective and more
prospective or legislative; less compensatory and more policy shaping; less party initiated and
controlled, more judicially shaped and structured. Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in
Public Law Litigation, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1281 (1976).
40

Kearney and Merrill, supra note 6, at 749-50 (at the beginning of the twentieth century,
amicus filings were made in approximately 10% of the Supreme Court=s cases; in recent years,
one or more amicus briefs were filed in 85% of the Court=s argued cases); see also Madeleine
Schachter, The Utility of Pro Bono Representation of US Based Amicus Curiae in Non-US and
Multi-National Courts as a Means of Advancing the Public Interest, 28 Fordham Int=l L. J. 88, 95
(2004).
41

Frequently referred to as Alitigating amicus@, courts sought input from governmental
entities and granted permission to them to actively participate as amicus curiae in complex civil
rights cases. See e.g. Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1260 (9th Cir 1982)(U.S. Department of
Justice requested by court to participate in case as amicus curiae with full party rights); Mashpee
Tribe v. New Seabury Corp., 592 F.2d 575, 580 (1st Cir.)(U.S. Deparment of Interior requested
to participate as amicus curiae/intervenor at trial), cert denied, 444 U.S. 866 (1979); In re Estelle,
516 F.2d 480, 482 (5th Cir. 1975)(United States permitted to participate as amicus with full party
rights). The expanded role of government amicus curiae eventually spilled over to private
individuals and organizations who sought to participate as non parties by serving as litigating
amicus curiae. Michigan Prisons Case, 940 F.2d 143, 147 (6th Cir. 1991)(reviewing district
court=s decision to grant litigating amicus status which permitted nonparties to file motions,
12

court, the most common form of amicus activity today remains at the appellate level.
B. The Role of Amicus Curiae in Modern Litigation
At its most basic level, the amicus curiae tool allows an entity that is separate from the
parties to provide legal or factual information to the court, creating an appearance of neutrality
which may or may not be a reality. The information presented can range from a repetition of
legal arguments already before the court (in essence, an endorsement backed by the prestige of
the entity offering it) to the presentation of new legal arguments or facts that inform the court of
potential impacts of the litigation.42 More subtly, amicus curiae may play a strategic role by
suggesting weak legal arguments that are morally appealing (if the argument is a loser, the party
may disassociate itself from the position),43 an educational role by presenting technical
information that creates a fuller context for the court to decide the case, or a census role by
providing a barometer of public opinion on an issue, particularly when a large number of entities
are involved as cosponsors or separate filers of amicus briefs.

present evidence, conduct discovery and seek enforcement of consent decree, among other
things); United States v. Michigan (Michigan Fishing Rights Case), 471 F. Supp 192 (W.D.
Mich. 1979), remanded, 623 F.2d 448 (6th Cir. 1980), modified, 653 F.2d 277 (6th Cir), cert
denied, 475 U.S. 1018 (1986)(court permitted private litigating amicus curiae to participate in
the settlement discussions, to help select a special master and to participate in discovery); Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission v. Boeing Co., 109 F.R.D. 6, 8 (W.D. Wash. 1985)(court
permitted non party to participate in a hybrid status falling Asomewhere between that of an
amicus and an intervenor@); Wyatt v. Stickney,344 F.Supp. 373, 374 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff=d in
part, rev=d in part sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974)(ACLU as amicus
curiae gave testimony, submitted briefs, proposed and negotiated remedies).
42

Krislov, 72 Yale L. J. at 711.

43

Id. at 712 (A...a weak legal argument, with a moral quality, forcefully presented by an
>outsider= will not detract from the force of the main argument... The amici should be providing
arguments that will salvage the judges= consciences or square with their prepossessions should
they lean toward holding for us....@)
13

In light of the array of uses that amicus briefs may serve, it is not surprising that judges
have expressed an array of opinions regarding the value of such briefs. For example, Justice
Breyer has described the amicus brief as a valuable tool in educating judges, particularly on
technical matters,44 but Judge Posner has been critical of the inefficiencies created by amicus
briefs, noting that Athe vast majority of amicus briefs are filed by allies of the litigants and
duplicate the arguments made in the litigant=s briefs.@45 Justice Scalia has suggested that amicus
curiae provide a type of interest group lobbying and has expressed concern that over
representation by well organized interest groups has the potential to impact decisions by the
Court.46 These comments suggest that the value accorded to amicus briefs depends upon
function that they are intended to serve.
There are two basic theories on the utility of amicus briefs: the affected groups theory
and the information theory. The affected groups theory states:
Insofar as the Justices are assumed to try to resolve cases in accordance with the weight
of public opinion, they should look to amicus briefs as a barometer of opinion on both
sides of the issues. Moreover, the information that amicus briefs convey about organized
opinion is such that it can largely be assimilated simply by looking at the cover of the
brief. The Justices can scan the covers of the brief to see which organizations care
strongly about the issue on either side. The fact that the organization saw fit to file the

44

Justice Breyer Calls for Experts to Aid Courts in Complex Cases, N.Y. Times, Feb. 17,
1998 (at A17).
45

Ryan v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm=n, 125 F.3d 1062, 1063 (7th Cit. 1997).

46

Jaffee v. Redmond,518 U.S. 1, (1996); Joseph D. Kearney, Thomas Merrill, The
Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on the Supreme Court, 148 U. Penn. at 747.
14

brief is the important datum, not the legal arguments or the background information set
forth between the covers of the brief.47
This is an interesting theory, in part because traditional jurisprudence would suggest that the
judicial branch is to be insulated from majoritarian pressures, not subject to them. Yet, the
judiciary=s institutional legitimacy is ultimately dependant upon the influence of its decisions
upon society. To the extent that the strength of the judicial system depends upon having its
decisions followed and not overridden, altered or ignored, judges have an incentive to fit within
the parameters of broadly shared public opinion.48 Moreover, lacking the purse and the sword,
the judicial branch is not equipped to enforce its decisions without the assistance of the other
branches of government and the goodwill of the citizenry.49 Thus, while the judicial branch is
theoretically shielded from majoritarian forces, the practical reality suggests that some
consideration of public opinion may be prudent.
Alternatively, the information theory suggests that amicus briefs are effective not because
they provide a barometer of public sentiment but rather because they supplement the arguments
of the parties by providing information not found in the parties= briefs.50 Such supplemental
information might present legal arguments from another perspective, present policy
consequences of particular legal interpretations, describe common interpretations of relevant
47

Kearney and Merrill, supra note 6, at 785.

48

Collins, supra note 7, at 812(ATo be sure, the justices only share policymaking authority
with the other branches of government. Should they stray too far from the public opinion on an
issue, it is likely that the legislature may attempt to alter or override their decision or the
executive may indifferently enforce the decision.@)
49

Id.

50

Id. at 815.
15

laws,51 or present factual data such as social science information that is absent from the appellate
record.52 This theory is more inline with common thought that amicus briefs facilitate judicial
decision making by educating the decision maker.53
In order to consider how each of these models might apply, we may look to the docket of
Hamden v. Rumsfeld showing a list of almost 50 amicus curiae briefs. Perusing the list of amici
provides a glimpse at the diverse interests represented by those entities who sought to
participate.54 If one were to strictly apply the affected groups theory, the Court could efficiently

51

James Spriggs & Paul Wahlbeck, Amicus Curiae and the Role of Information at the
Supreme Court, 50 Political Research Q. 365, 372 (1997).
52

Michael Rustad and Thomas Koenig, The Supreme Court and Junk Science: Selective
Distortion in Amicus Briefs, 72 N.C. L. Rev. 91, 94 (1991). See also, David L Faigman, To
Have and Have Not: Assessing the Value of Social Science to the Law as Science and Policy, 38
Emory L. J. 1005, 1079 (1989)(AThe legal relevance of social science research cannot be
divorced from its scientific credibility@).
53

Collins, supra note 7 at 815-16.

54

In Hamden v. Rumsfeld, docket 05-184 (2005), amicus briefs were filed on behalf of
the following entities and individuals: National Institute of Military Justice; Office of Chief
Defense Counsel; Retired Generals and Admirals; Human Rights First; Louis Fischer; United
Kingdom and European Parliamentarians; Louis Doswald-Beck; Legal Scholars and Historians;
Association of the Bar of the City of New York; Historians Jack N. Rakove, et al; International
Law Professors; Urban Morgan Institute for Human Rights; Norman Dorsen; Brennan Center for
Justice; William N. Eskridge Jr.; Richard A. Epstein, et. al.; General David Brahms and General
James Cullen; Retired Generals and Admirals and Milt Bearden; Yemeni National Organization
for Defending Rights and Freedoms; Binyam Mohamed; 422 Current and Former Members of
United Kingdom and European Union Parliaments; Law Professors Richard I Aaron, et al.;
Office of Military Commissions; Specialists in Conspiracy and International Law; Cato Institute;
Bar Association of the District of Columbia; Lawrence M. Friedman, Jonathan Lurie, and Alfred
P. Rubin; Center for National Security Studies; Law Professors Louis Henkin, et al.; American
Civil Liberties Union, Bar Human Rights Committee of the Bar of England and Wales, et al.;
american Jewish Committee, et al.; Professors Ryan Goodman, et al.; More than 300 Detainees
Incarcerated at U.S. Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, et al.; Association of the Bar of the
City of New York; Ibrahim Ahmed Mahmoud Al Qosi; Madeleine K. Albright and 21 Former
Senior U.S. Diplomats; Certain Former Federal Judges; International Human Rights
Organizations for Constitutional Rights, et al.; Professor Richard D. Rosen, Associate Dean and
16

gain the relevant information offered by these amicus briefs from merely looking at the entities
who were interested enough to file a brief and counting the Avotes@ on either side (every amicus
brief is required to identify the party that they support on the cover of the brief, thus making the
vote counting quite straight forward). To the extent that the affected groups theory attributes
significance to the fact that an entity had sufficient interest to invest the time, energy and
resources in filing a brief, this theory fails to account for the fact that certain interested groups
will fail to file an amicus brief due to lack of resources, not lack of interest. Moreover, a mere
Acounting@of votes discounts the true value of the judicial process which is to deliberate through
facts, law and policy to reach a thoughtful decision, not to survey public opinion. The
information theory, on the other hand, would suggest that a greater potential value would be
gained by considering the content of the briefs to determine if the substantive information
offered will assist in the decision making process. Yet, the information theory fails to take into
consideration the perspective of the entity offering the information. Thus, the information theory
suggests that substantive information is equally valuable whether it is offered by an amicus
curiae who has a direct interest or one who has no interest in the underlying issue at all. While
neither theory alone explains the utility of amicus briefs, together these theories suggest that both
the information provided and the perspective from which it is offered are relevant considerations

Director of Center for Military Law and Policy, et al.; National Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers; Arthur R. Miller; David Hicks; Former Attorneys General of the United States, et at.;
Senators Graham and Kyl; Washington Legal Foundation, et al.; American Center for Law and
Justice; Citizens for Common Defence; Criminal Justice Legal Foundation.
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in evaluating the utility of amicus briefs.

III. Empirical Analysis: A View From the Bench
Any analysis of the value added by amicus curiae would be incomplete without input
from the decision makers who receive and ponder these briefs in relation to cases that must be
decided. In an effort to collect such data, I designed a survey to collect insights, thoughts and
experiences from federal judges at various levels of the federal judiciary. In drafting the survey,
I attempted to reduce the possibility of survey error as much as possible. First, in light of the
relatively small number of federal judges at the Supreme, Circuit and District Courts, I decided
to collect my data from the entire population, thereby reducing potential sampling error.
Specifically, I sent the survey to 10 U.S. Supreme Court Justices (including recently retired
Justice Sandra Day O=Connor), 252 U.S. Circuit Court Judges, and 973 U.S. District Court
Judges. Second, by surveying the entire population I was able to significantly reduce potential
coverage error. Coverage error occurs when the list from which a sample is drawn fails to
include all elements of a population, thus skewing the survey by failing to give all elements of
the population a chance at participation.55 Given that I sent the survey to the entire population,
the only potential coverage error would result from an incomplete or inaccurate list of the
population or an administrative glitch in the mailing of the surveys. While I cannot guarantee a
coverage error of zero, I am confident that the survey provided a close to equal chance for all
elements of the population to participate and the responses indicate that all elements of the
55

Don A. Dillman, Mail and Internet Surveys, The Tailored Design Method, at 9 (Second
Ed. 2000)(Aan example [of coverage error] would be the omission of people without telephones
from a telephone survey@).
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population did in fact participate in the survey. Specifically, I received responses from every
level of the federal judiciary, including the Supreme Court, and at least one response was
received from every Circuit, and from 93 of the 94 Districts. The third source of potential error,
measurement error, results from ambiguous questions that create imprecise responses that cannot
be effectively measured.56 In analyzing the survey responses, I was able to identify several
questions that resulted in ambiguous responses. In an effort to reduce measurement error, I have
excluded all of these questions and focused my attention on the questions that yielded clear and
unambiguous responses. Finally, the fourth source of potential error, nonresponse error, occurs
when Aa significant number of people in the survey sample do not respond to the questionnaire
and have different characteristics from those who do respond, when these characteristics are
important to the study.@57 I incorporated several implementation strategies to attempt to reduce
nonresponse error, including a personally addressed cover letter which explained the
significance of the study, ensured complete confidentiality, offered my telephone number and
email address for correspondence and thanked the recipient for their participation. I included a
self addressed envelope and the questionnaire, which was relatively short and could be
completed in approximately 5-10 minutes. Six weeks after the first mailing, I sent a follow up
letter to anyone from whom I had not received any response (either a completed survey or
communication indicating a lack of interest in completing the survey) and a new copy of the
questionnaire. As a result of these efforts, the response rate ranged from 23% to 30% of the
population. Specifically, the survey resulted in a 30% response rate from Supreme Court
56

Dillman, Elements of the Tailored Design, at 9.

57

Id. at 10.
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Justices,58 a 23.8% response rate from Circuit Court Judges and a 23.3% response rate from
District Court Judges.59 The similarity of response rates, particularly at the circuit and district
court levels, suggests that participation at each of the three levels of the judiciary was
comparable, thus providing no evidence of nonresponsiveness by a group of the population with
different characteristics from the rest of the population. Moreover, the completed response pools
of 60 Circuit Court Judges and 227 District Court Judges should correlate to the statistical
significance that would result from completed sample sizes if 60 Circuit Judges were sampled
from a population of 252 and 227 District Court Judges were sampled from a population of 973.
Completed samples of this size would allow one to estimate the characteristics of the entire
population to within 10 percentage points, plus or minus.60
The results of the survey are reported below.

What percentage of cases on your docket involve amicus curiae?
The response to this question substantiated the perception that amicus curiae are much

58

Three Supreme Court Justices responded from a population of 10 to whom I sent the
survey. Given the size of the population and response pool, it is difficult to draw statistically
significant information to estimate the responses of that segment of the population that did not
respond. In light of this limitation, I have tried to identify the individual responses of Supreme
Court participants as evidence of the variety of viewpoints held rather than as an estimate of a
viewpoint that is shared by the larger population.
59

Sixty Circuit Court Judges responded from a population of 252 Circuit Judges and
every circuit was represented by at least one respondent (First Circuit 3; Second Circuit 8; Third
Circuit 12; Fourth Circuit 2; Fifth Circuit 5; Sixth Circuit 6; Seventh Circuit 2; Eighth Circuit 6;
Ninth Circuit 12; Tenth Circuit 3; Eleventh Circuit 4; D.C. Circuit 2; Federal Circuit 1). Among
the District Court Judges, 227 responded from a population of 973, and 93 of the 94 districts
were represented by at least one respondent.
60

Dillman, The Tailored Design Method, at 206-207.
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more heavily involved in Supreme Court litigation than either Circuit or District Court litigation.
Not surprisingly, all of the Supreme Court respondents indicated that more than 50% of their
cases involve amicus curiae. In contrast, a significant majority of Circuit Court respondents
(79%) indicated that 5% or less of their docket involve amicus curiae. 61 Only twelve Circuit
Court Judges (21.1% of all respondents) indicated 15% or more of their cases involve amicus
curiae.62 At the district court level, amicus activity was even less significant, with the vast
majority of district court judges (79.2%) responding that amicus activity was nominal or zero,
and 19.9% indicating that approximately 5% of their docket involved amicus curiae.63 Of the
District Court respondents who indicated that approximately 5% of their docket involved amicus
curiae briefs, identifiable clusters appeared in district courts in New York64 and California.65
Interestingly, when judges perceive a need for additional information they will
61

Of the 60 Circuit Court respondents, 24.6% indicated that 0% of their docket involved
amicus briefs, 54.4% indicated that approximately 5% of their docket involved amicus briefs,
19.3% indicated that 15% of their docket involved amicus briefs, and 1.8% indicated
approximately 25% of their docket involved amicus briefs.
62

The responses point to the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals and the Ninth Circuit for more
significant amicus activity. Specifically, all of the respondents from the District of Columbia
Circuit who responded to the survey estimated that approximately 15% of their docket involved
amicus curiae, while 25% of the Ninth Circuit Judges who responded estimated that 15% (or
more) of their docket involved amicus curiae. The remaining respondents who indicated an
increase in amicus activity were spread among the remaining circuits.
63

Of the 227 District Court respondents, only .9% (2 respondents) indicated that more
than 5% of their docket involved amicus curiae.
64

Five of the 11 respondents from the Southern District of New York and both of the
respondents from the Northern District of New York estimated that 5% of their docket involved
amicus curiae.
65

5 of the 10 respondents from districts in California estimated that 5% of their docket
involved amicus curiae.
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occasionally request amicus participation. Specifically, 54.2% of the Circuit Court respondents
and 13.6% of the District Court respondents have requested amicus participation in a case, often
reaching out to a governmental agency or entity to serve as amicus. In other instances, courts
have issued open invitations for interested amicus curiae to file briefs on specific issues. For
example, in United States v. Yida, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
issued an order "invit[ing] supplemental letter briefs by the parties and any amicus curiae"
discussing two designated questions (and issuing blanket leave to file such amicus briefs.)66
In cases involving amicus curiae, are you influenced by the identity, prestige, or
experience of the amicus curiae?
The response to this question indicates that federal judges are influenced by factors
beyond the content of the brief submitted by the amicus curiae. All three of the Supreme Court
Justices who responded to the survey indicated that these factors (particularly experience) are
moderately influential in the decision making process. Similarly, a majority of the Circuit Court
(55.3%)67 and District Court (59.1%)68 respondents indicated that identity/prestige/experience

66

United States v. Yida, No. 06-10460. Such open invitations are also issued somewhat
regularly by other courts. See Massachusetts Lawyers Weekly, March 5, 2007, at 11
(Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court publishes notice soliciting amicus briefs in 4 separate
cases).
67

Of the 60 Circuit Court respondents, 17.9% indicated that identity, prestige, experience
had no influence, 26.8% indicated that these factors had little influence, 33.9% indicated that
these factors had moderate influence, and 21.4% indicated that these factors had significant
influence.
68

Of the 227 District Court respondents, 23.9% indicated that identity, prestige, or
experience had no influence, 17% indicated that these factors had little influence, 41.5%
indicated that these factors had moderate influence, and 17.6% indicated that these factors had
significant influence.
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are moderately or significantly influential.
In a telephone interview with Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg we discussed why these
factors may hold influence. In her opinion, the experience of the attorney (particularly
experience before the Supreme Court) would be a likely barometer of the quality of the
arguments set forth in the brief. She went on to say that her clerks often divide the amicus briefs
into three piles: those that should be skipped entirely; those that should be skimmed; those that
should be read in full. If the attorney submitting the amicus brief has significant experience
before the Court, it would be more likely that their brief would be placed in a higher priority pile.
In cases involving amicus curiae, are you influenced by the number of amicus curiae
(including co-signors) or the number of amicus briefs filed?
The Supreme Court respondents unanimously indicated that the number of amicus briefs
filed tends to have zero influence on their considerations of the case. One Supreme Court Justice
responded that the number of amicus curiae (including co signors) might have a little influence,
while the two other Supreme Court respondents thought that the number of amicus curiae would
provide no influence.69 Circuit and District Court respondents similarly indicated that these
factors were not tremendously influential. Specifically, 82.2% of Circuit Court respondents
indicated that the number of amicus curiae provided little or no influence and 83.3% indicated
that the number of amicus briefs provided little or no influence in the outcome of the dispute.70
69

One Supreme Court Justice also noted that the number of amicus curiae is generally of
little no consequence, Aunless it is from many of the states.@
70

Of this number, 42.9% indicated that the number of amicus curiae held zero influence
and 46.3% indicated that the number of briefs held zero influence. Only 17.9% of Circuit Court
respondents indicated that the number of amicus curiae were Amoderately@ influential, and 16.7%
indicated that the number of briefs filed was Amoderately influential.@
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Similarly, 79.2% of District Court respondents indicated that the number of amicus curiae
provided little or no influence and 77.7% indicating that the number of briefs provided little or
no influence in the outcome of the dispute.71
The obvious concern with Ame too@ briefs is efficiency B such briefs inundate the courts
with volumes of paper and offer little added value. It is not surprising therefore, that judges do
not want to encourage such duplicity. What is surprising is that the respondents similarly did not
seek to encourage co signors on amicus briefs. One would expect that if judges were interested
in learning about the number of affected groups, they could gather some of this information by
considering who has agreed to sign onto a brief. At all three levels of the federal judiciary, the
respondents considered the number of amicus curiae and the number of briefs filed close to equal
in terms of influence (or rather non influence).
Must we conclude that the affected groups theory is irrelevant? Not necessarily. One
Supreme Court Justice who responded that the number of briefs was not influential and the
number of amicus curiae was only marginally influential, did comment that Agroups that are
affected often help@ to provide information relevant to the decision making process. Thus, while
courts do not seek to turn the judicial process into a voting process where the judges merely
count the number of groups which hold a certain opinion or perspective, they do appear to be

71

Of this number, 48.7% indicated that the number of amicus curiae held zero influence
and 51.6% indicated that the number of briefs held zero influence. Only 18.8% of District Court
respondents indicated that the number of amicus curiae were Amoderately@ influential, and 19.6%
indicated that the number of briefs filed was Amoderately influential.@
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willing to consider the substantive information offered by affected groups.
D. Do you believe amicus curiae may be helpful in any of the following functions?
... To offer legal arguments that are absent from the parties= briefs.
The responses indicate that judges at all three levels of the federal bench find amicus
curiae helpful in offering new legal arguments that are absent from the parties= briefs. All of the
Supreme Court respondents indicated that this was a helpful function, as did both the Circuit72
and District Court73 respondents (78.9% and 82.5%, respectively, felt that this function was
moderately or very helpful). The overwhelming response to this question is consistent with the
education function described by the information theory.
It is not uncommon for amicus curiae to suggest alternative or supplemental support for a
legal conclusion that might be too risky for a litigant to embrace.74 For example, in Mapp v.

72

Of the 60 Circuit Court respondents, 3.5% responded that it is a hindrance when amicus
offer new legal arguments, 17.5% responded that new legal arguments are not a help or a
hindrance in the process, 42.1% responded that new legal arguments are moderately helpful, and
35% responded that new legal arguments are very helpful.
73

Of the 227 District Court respondents, 4.4% responded that it is a hindrance when
amicus offer new legal arguments, 13.1% responded that new legal arguments are not a help or a
hindrance in the process, 54.1% responded that new legal arguments are moderately helpful, and
28.4% responded that new legal arguments are very helpful.
74

Madeleine Schachter, 28 Fordham Int=l L. J. 88 at 100-103 (2004). See also Samuel
Krislov, The Amicus Curiae Brief: From Friendship to Advocacy, 72 Yale L. J. 694, 713 196263)(AWhere there is relatively adequate representation of the basic points of view, the amicus
curiae ... may perform a valuable subsidiary role by introducing subtle variations of the basic
argument, or emotive and even questionable arguments that might result in a successful verdict
but are too risky to be embraced by the principal litigant. The strategy here is the reverse of that
utilized by BrandeisB instead of identifying new techniques with a litigant=s official position, it
may very well be advantageous to label the new as unofficial so that if it should be rejected, a
minimum of disapprobation attaches to the official cause.@)
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Ohio75 the Supreme Court reviewed a woman=s conviction for knowing possession of lewd and
lascivious material in violation of the Ohio penal code. The appellant challenged the
constitutionality of the Ohio statute but chose not to argue for the reversal of Supreme Court
precedent (which held that the Fourteenth Amendment would not prohibit the admission of
evidence obtained through an unreasonable search and seizure in state court for violation of a
state crime.)76 Commenting on the fact that the appellant chose not to present this argument, the
Court noted that Aappellant chose to urge what may have appeared to be the surer ground for
favorable disposition and did not insist that [Wolf v. Colorado] be overruled.@ Notwithstanding
this strategic choice, the ACLU, appearing as amicus curiae, supplemented the arguments made
by the parties and expressly urged the Court to overrule Wolf. Ultimately, a majority of the
Court agreed with the argument presented by the ACLU and the Court overruled the precedent
set in Wolf to hold that Aall evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the
constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a state court.@77
Notwithstanding the fact that courts frequently consider new legal arguments presented
in amicus briefs, courts may impose limits on this role when it appears that the amicus curiae
seeks to hijack control of the litigation. Thus, while amici are allowed to set forth new
arguments and perspectives that help resolve the issues raised by the parties -- indeed amici are
criticized if they merely duplicate the information presented by the parties -- they may not stray
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Mapp v. Ohio, 367 US 643 (1961)

76

Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25,33 (1949).

77

367 U.S. at 655.
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too far from the agenda as set by the parties.78 The Supreme Court, for example, has refused to
consider arguments presented by amici when Athe party to the case [] has in effect renounced
them@79 and the D.C. Circuit has cited the Arule of avoidance@ in refusing to consider a new
constitutional question raised by amici.80

Do you believe amicus curiae may be helpful in any of the following functions?
...to focus the court=s attention on matters that extend beyond the parties= dispute
but impact a direct interest held by the amicus which may be materially impacted
by the outcome of the case in which the amicus seeks to participate.

78

Resident Council of Allen Parkway Vill v. HUD, 980 F2d 1043, 1049 (5th Cir. 1993);
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 255 F.3d at 852 (dissenting opinion).
79

New Jersey v. New York, 523 U.S. 761, 781 n. 3 (1998). See also, Amax Land Co. v.
Quarterman, 181 F.3d 1356, 1367 (D.C. Cir. 1999)(following parties request for a remand
instead of amicus= request that D.C. Cir. resolve the issue); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 255 F.3d 849,
851 (2001)(court deems it Aparticularly inappropriate in this case to reach the merits of the
amicus=s position.@)
80

Eldred v. Ashcroft, 255 f.3d 849 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
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There was broad support for amicus curiae who focus the court=s attention on matters that
impact a direct interest that is likely to be materially impacted by the case. Specifically, all of
the Supreme Court respondents indicated that this information would be moderately to very
helpful, while 73.7% of the Circuit Court respondents81 and 71.2% of the District Court
respondents82 indicated that the information offered by affected groups would be moderately or
very helpful.

Do you believe amicus curiae may be helpful in any of the following functions?
...to focus the court=s attention on matters that extend beyond the parties= dispute
but impact an ideological interest held by the amicus curiae.

81

Of the 60 Circuit Court respondents, 7% responded that it is a hindrance when amicus
comment on matters that extend beyond the parties= dispute but impact a direct interest of the
amicus, 19.3% responded that this information is not helpful or harmful, 43.9% responded that
such information is moderately helpful, and 29.8% responded that such information is very
helpful.
82

Of the 227 District Court respondents, 8.2% responded that it is a hindrance when
amicus comment on matters that extend beyond the parties= dispute but impact a direct interest of
the amicus, 19.1% responded that this information is not helpful or harmful, 47% responded that
such information is moderately helpful, and 25.7% responded that such information is very
helpful.
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In contrast to the response to the previous question, there was much less support for
amicus who focused the court=s attention on their own ideological interests. In fact, one
Supreme Court Justice felt that such ideological information was a hindrance to the process. At
the Circuit Court level, 69.1% of the respondents felt that information concerning an ideological
interest held by the amicus would offer no help in the decision making process.83 At the District
Court level, 67.4% indicated that the ideological interests of the amicus would offer no help.84
The responses to this question and the previous question dovetail with the affected groups theory
in that federal judges are interested in learning about the potential impact of their decisions, but
they seek to hear this from an affected group whose direct interests may be materially impacted
rather than from groups or individuals with an ideological interest that they wish to share.
Do you believe amicus curiae may be helpful in any of the following functions?
...to facilitate a party who is not adequately represented.
Amicus curiae may serve a valuable role when a party is inadequately represented. A
majority of the Circuit Court respondents (78.6%)85 and the District Court respondents (71.2%)86

83

Of the 60 Circuit Court respondents, 38.2% responded that it is a hindrance when
amicus comment on an ideological interest of the amicus, 30.9% responded that this information
is not helpful or harmful, 23.6% responded that such information is moderately helpful, and only
7.3% responded that such information is very helpful.
84

Of the 227 Circuit Court respondents, 30.3% responded that it is a hindrance when
amicus comment on an ideological interest of the amicus, 37.1% responded that this information
is not helpful or harmful, 24.2% responded that such information is moderately helpful, and only
8.4% responded that such information is very helpful.
85

Of the 60 Circuit Court respondents, 42.9% responded that amicus curiae are very
helpful and 35.7% responded that amicus curiae are moderately helpful when a party is
inadequately represented. Only 5.4% responded that such help is a hindrance and 16.1%
responded that amicus curiae are not a help or a hindrance when a party is inadequately
represented.
86

Of the 227 District Court respondents, 20.6% responded that amicus curiae are very
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indicated that amicus curiae are helpful in facilitating a party who is not adequately represented.
The response was less overwhelming by the Supreme Court respondents, which could possibly
be more of an indication of the quality of representation before the Court than the utility of
amicus curiae for this purpose.87
Do you believe amicus curiae may be helpful in any of the following functions?
...to participate as litigating amicus by conducting discovery, or participating in
trial stages of litigation.
Not surprisingly, the respondents at all levels of the federal judiciary do not see
tremendous utility in litigating amici. Specifically, 90.9% of Circuit Court respondents88 and
89% of District Court respondents89 indicated that litigating amici are a hindrance or a neutral
consideration in litigation and two Supreme Court respondents indicated that litigating amici
would be a hindrance.
Do you believe amicus curiae may be helpful in any of the following functions?
...to emphasize factual information and/or legal arguments that are present in the
record and/or parties briefs
helpful and 50.6% responded that amicus curiae are moderately helpful when a party is
inadequately represented. Only 9.4% responded that such help is a hindrance and 19.4%
responded that amicus curiae are not a help or a hindrance when a party is inadequately
represented.
87

One Justice indicated that facilitating a party who is inadequately represented is a very
helpful function of amicus curiae, while another Justice indicated that amici who perform this
role are a hindrance to the decision making process.
88

Of the 60 Circuit Court respondents, 36.4% responded that litigating amicus are a
hindrance to the decision making process, and 54.5% responded that they offer no help in the
process. Only 2.3% responded that litigating amicus are very helpful and 6.8% responded that
they are moderately helpful.
89

Of the 227 District Court respondents, 59.5% responded that litigating amicus are a
hindrance to the decision making process, and 29.5% responded that they offer no help in the
process. Only 1.7% responded that litigating amicus are very helpful and 9.2% responded that
they are moderately helpful.
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The respondent judges did not agree on the utility of amicus briefs that emphasize
arguments that have already been presented by the parties. Specifically, of the two Supreme
Court Justices who responded to this question, both thought that briefs which merely duplicated
arguments already before the Court offered no help in the decision making process. Similarly, a
slight majority of the District Court respondents (53.3%) indicated that emphasis on the parties=
arguments offered no help.90 Of the Circuit Court respondents, however, a slight majority
(58.2%) indicated that such information can be moderately to very helpful.91
Do you believe amicus curiae may be helpful in any of the following functions?
...to offer relevant factual information that is absent from the record and/or parties=
briefs
The response to this question raised very interesting results. The Supreme Court
respondents unanimously indicated a favorable response to amicus curiae who offer factual
information that is absent from the record (two of the three respondents indicated that such
information is Avery helpful@). Contrary to the strong response from the Supreme Court
respondents, the Circuit Court and District Court respondents were lukewarm on the usefulness
of new factual information presented by amicus curiae. In fact, a majority of the Circuit Court
and District Court respondents (66.7% and 52.6%, respectively) believed that offering new
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Of the 227 District Court respondents, 12.2% indicated that merely emphasizing the
parties= arguments is a hindrance, 41.1% indicated that this role was neither a help or a
hindrance, 37.8% indicated that this role is moderately helpful and 8.9% indicated that this role
is very helpful.
91

Of the 60 Circuit Court respondents, 10.9% indicated that merely emphasizing the
parties= arguments is a hindrance, 30.9% indicated that this role was neither a help or a
hindrance, 49.1% indicated that this role is moderately helpful and 9.1% indicated that this role
is very helpful.
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factual information was a hindrance or a neutral factor in the process.92 Only 33.3% of the
Circuit Court respondents and 47.4% of the District Court respondents93 indicated any
helpfulness offered by new factual information.94
Several survey respondents included written comments to elaborate on the usefulness of
extra record factual information. Some respondents indicated that only facts that have been
admitted into the record in accordance with the Rules of Evidence should be considered, and all
other factual information should be excluded from judicial consideration. Other respondents
noted that legislative facts95 or material of which one can properly take judicial notice96 would

92

Notably, 24.6% of the Circuit Court respondents and 25.7% of the District Court
respondents felt that amici who presented new factual information were a hindrance to the
process.
93

Of the 227 District Court respondents, 25.7% indicated that it is a hindrance when
amici offer new factual information, and 26.9% indicated that such information offers no help in
the decision making process. Only 11.4% indicated new factual information is very helpful and
36% indicated that such information is moderately helpful.
94

Of the 60 Circuit Court respondents, 24.6% indicated that it is a hindrance when amici
offer new factual information, and 42.1 indicated that such information offers no help in the
decision making process. Only 14% indicated new factual information is very helpful and
19.3% indicated that such information is moderately helpful.
95

Legislative facts are facts which inform the policy judgments of the court as opposed to
adjudicative facts which are the facts relevant to the elements or claims to be proven in the case.
Emerging Problems Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, American Bar Association Section of
Litigation, at 29 (3rd ed. 1998).
96

The Federal Rules of Evidence govern judicial notice of adjudicative facts, providing:
AA judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1)
generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and
easy determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.@ Rule
201(b). Notably, Rule 201(e) provides that A[a] party is entitled upon timely request to an
opportunity to be heard as to the propriety of taking judicial notice and the tenor of the matter
noticed. In the absence of prior notification, the request may be made after judicial notice has
been taken.@
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be appropriate extra record factual information for an amicus to present.97 In a telephone
conversation, Justice Ginsburg explained that the type of extra record factual information that
she finds to be valuable might reflect upon the experience of the amicus curiae relative to the
issue at hand. For example, she noted that in the Grutter decision, one of the most valuable briefs
was submitted by former administrators of the military academies who suggested the negative
impact that would result from a lack of diversity among military officers. She also mentioned as
helpful amicus briefs submitted by business professionals who indicated the importance of
diversity to the entities they served.98
E. How do you evaluate amicus participation by each of the following?
... Government (U.S. Solicitor General, state or federal attorneys, etc)
Amicus curiae briefs offered by governmental entities were favored at all levels of the
federal bench. Specifically, all three Supreme Court respondents indicated that amicus briefs
offered by governmental entities, particularly the U.S. Solicitor General, tend to be very helpful
to the Court. Similarly, the Circuit and District Court respondents ranked the government as the
most helpful amicus curiae, with 96.3% of Circuit Court and 86.4% of District Court respondents
indicating that the government is either moderately or very helpful.99
97

Appellate courts are generally allowed to take judicial notice of facts that are not part of
the record on appeal. Emerging Problems Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, at 32.
98

In Grutter v. Bollinger, the Court noted that the University of Michigan=s claim of a
compelling interest was Abolstered by its amici, who pointed to the educational benefits that flow
from student body diversity.@ 539 US at 330
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Of the 60 Circuit Court respondents, 50% indicated that the government is generally
very helpful and 46.3% indicated that the government is moderately helpful when serving as
amicus. Only 1.9% indicated that the government=s participation as amicus is a hindrance and
only 1.9% indicated that the government offers no help as an amicus.
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Various explanations might be given to justify the high regard courts appear to hold for
governmental amicus curiae. Governmental bodies provide institutional expertise that may
prove helpful in determining the broader impacts of a particular judicial decision. To the extent
that courts are involved in declaring social policy, the participation of other branches of
government may help to legitimate the process by allowing, indeed on occasion requesting, input
from the elected branches. Moreover, in light of the fact that courts are unable to enforce their
judgments without the help of the other branches, participation as amici may facilitate the
enforcement of judicial decisions down the road.100
How do you evaluate amicus participation by each of the following?
... Special Interest Groups (NAACP, ACLU, etc.)
Special interest groups are generally well regarded as amicus curiae, particularly if they
are commenting on how their direct interests will be affected by a decision in the case.101
Among the Supreme Court respondents, all three indicated that special interest groups tend to be
moderately helpful, depending of course on the group and the extent of their interest in the issue.
The Circuit Court and District Court respondents similarly ranked special interest groups as less
helpful than governmental amicus, but still a significant source of information. Specifically,

Of the 227 District Court respondents, 30.6% indicated that the government is generally
very helpful and 55.8% indicated that the government is moderately helpful when serving as
amicus. Only 1.4% indicated that the government=s participation as amicus is a hindrance and
only 12.2% indicated that the government offers no help as an amicus.
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Michael Lowman, 41 Am. U. L. Rev. 1243, 1262 (1992).
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One judge from the Southern District of New York noted that the ACLU is a frequent
participant in litigation in this Circuit, Aoften in cases of limited congruence with its stated goals,
or even apparently in contradiction to its litigating principles. It does not seem to meet with
great success, perhaps for this reason.@
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56.6% of Circuit Court respondents102 and 53.1% of District Court respondents103 indicated that
special interest groups tend to be Amoderately helpful.@

How do you evaluate amicus participation by each of the following?
...law professors
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Of the 60 Circuit Court respondents, 1.9% indicated that special interest groups are a
hindrance, 26.4% indicated that special interest groups are a neutral factor, and 15.1% indicated
that special interest groups are very helpful.
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Of the 227 District Court respondents, 5.4% indicated that special interest groups are a
hindrance, 25.9% indicated that special interest groups are a neutral factor, and 15.6% indicated
that special interest groups are very helpful.
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As experts in particular fields of law, professors are able to offer an informed legal
analysis of a pressing legal question from a relatively neutral perspective. Thus, it is not
surprising that all of the Supreme Court respondents indicated that law professors are moderately
helpful to the process, as did 56.6% of Circuit Court respondents104 and 52.8% of District Court
respondents.105
Over the last decade there has been much discussion regarding the role of legal
scholarship in judicial decision making. In 1992, Judge Harry T. Edwards published a
provocative article in which he decried the growing disjuncture between legal education and
legal practice, noting that:
Amany >elite= law faculties in the United States now have significant contingents of
>impractical= scholars... The >impractical= scholar ... produces abstract scholarship that
has little relevance to concrete issues, or addresses concrete issues in a wholly theoretical
manner. As a consequence, ... judges, administrators, legislators, and practitioners have
little use for much of the scholarship that is now produced by members of the
academy.@106
To the extent that the atmosphere at some law schools is inhospitable for the scholar who
104

Of the 60 Circuit Court respondents, 7.5% indicated that law professors are a
hindrance, 22.6% indicated that law professors are a neutral factor, and 13.2% indicated that law
professors are very helpful.
105

Of the 227 District Court respondents, 8.3% indicated that law professors are a
hindrance, 22.9% indicated that law professors are a neutral factor, and 16% indicated that law
professors are very helpful.
106

Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal
Profession, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 34, 35 (1992). Judge Edwards clearly supports a role for theory in
the legal curriculum: AOver the past two decades, law and economics, law and literature, law and
sociology, and various other Alaw and@ movements have come to the fore in legal educatin. We
also have seen a growth in critical legal studies (CLS), critical race studies, and feminist legal
studies morements. In my view, all of these movements albeit measurably different in content
and purpose, have potential to serve important educational functions and, therefore, should have
a permanent home in the law schools. However, because many of the adherents of these
movements have a low regard for the practice of law, their emergence in legal education has
produced profound and untoward side effects.@ Id. at 34-35.
36

Awishes to provide helpful guidance on pressing social problems, and not to fight ivory-tower
conflicts that are irrelevant to the outside world,@107 the amicus brief may provide the vehicle
through which law professors may help to shape the development of the law by providing
thoughtful, practical, and theoretical insights that are relevant to real world disputes.
F. Do you believe that a financial relationship between a litigant and an amicus
curiae is relevant to a court=s decision to grant leave to file an amicus brief?
A majority of the respondents at all levels of the federal courts believe that a financial
relationship between the amicus curiae and a litigant is a relevant factor to consider in evaluating
the utility of the information offered by the amicus curiae. Specifically, two of the three
Supreme Court respondents, 54.5% of the Circuit Court respondents and 74.6% of the District
Court respondents indicated that a financial relationship would be relevant to consideration of a
proposed brief.
G. Do you believe that there is a need for stricter procedural rules to limit the
ability of non parties to participate in litigation as amicus curiae?
The overwhelming response to this question indicates that federal judges do not seek to
close the doors on amicus participation by enacting stricter procedural rules. Specifically, all of
the Supreme Court respondents, 87.7% of the Circuit Court respondents and 81.5% of the
District Court respondents agreed that there is no need to clamp down on amicus activity.
Interestingly, Justice Ginsburg noted that she did not think it necessary to impose stricter
procedural rules to limit participation, but also indicated that it would be helpful if groups could
coordinate their efforts and so that the judges could have access to the information but avoid the
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Id.
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inefficiency of Ame too@ briefs. She noted that Aa gem contained in one [brief] could be missed@
by the shear volume of briefs that are presented to the Court.
IV. Amicus Curiae: A Prospective Evaluation
The historical and empirical evidence indicates that over the last 100 years, amicus curiae
have played an increasingly significant role in federal litigation. They have inconspicuously
morphed from neutral advisor to open advocate. They have enjoyed virtually unfettered access
to the federal courts, first because their non party status has exempted them from even the basic
case or controversy requirements of Article III and second because the federal courts have
generously allowed their participation in all but a few instances. Moreover, the factual
information offered by amici has largely avoided a critical eye because many of the procedural
rules that protect the reliability of record evidence are inapplicable to information that is not
admitted into evidence. These facts, combined with the incentive to become involved in
litigation aimed at social reform, have given rise to a surge in amicus curiae activity in the
federal courts, particularly at the Supreme Court. In this section of the paper, I will consider the
implications of these developments and suggest some basic procedural reforms that may reduce
some of the concerns that have been expressed about the increased participation of amicus curiae
in federal litigation.

A. Do Amicus Curiae Undercut the Fundamental Values of Our Adversarial System?
In order to file a case in federal court, one must meet the requirements imposed by the
case or controversy language of Article III, namely standing, ripeness and mootness. Professor
Lea Brilmayer suggests that the case or controversy requirement, also commonly referred to as
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the justiciability doctrine, serves three interrelated policies: (1) Athe smooth allocation of power
among courts over time;@ (2) Athe [avoidance of] unfairness of holding later litigants to an
adverse judgment in which they may not have been properly represented;@ and (3) Athe
importance of placing control over political processes in the hands of people most closely
involved.@108
The first of these policies recognizes that the essence of the justiciability doctrine is
inextricably linked with stare decisis because the decisions of later courts are bound by the
choices of the present court.109 The effect of stare decisis is important in all litigation, but it is
particularly important in public law litigation because it is precisely the future binding effect of a
judicial decision that provides the force and incentive to induce individuals to conform their
future conduct to the parameters of judicial determinations. Without stare decisis, courts would
be limited to deciding single cases whose impact would be limited to specific litigants B a
situation which would severely reduce, if not eliminate, the value of judicial determinations of
social policy. Thus, the justiciability doctrine polices the allocation of power among courts over
time to ensure that the first court to make a binding determination does so after a dispute has
been brought forward by advocates with a real, cognizable, legal issue.
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Lea Brilmayer, 93 Harvard Law Review 297, 302 (1979).
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Id. at 304.
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The second and third policies served by justiciability focus on the determination of who
should be vested with authority to bring the issue and when the issue is ready to be determined.
Specifically, the second policy recognizes that when an issue is determined by a court, other
similarly situated individuals may be impacted by that determination. This result is inevitable, of
course, in light of the impact brought to bear by stare decisis B to the extent that future litigants
bring suits that are sufficiently similar to one that has been adjudicated, those litigants may be
bound by the precedent set by the first determination of the issue. In light of this fact, the
justiciability doctrine guarantees that a litigant have a personal stake in the outcome of the issue
B as opposed to having a purely ideological interest in the issue B because such a person is
believed to be the best representative of other potential litigants who share (or may in the future
share) a personal stake in the issue.110
The third policy rests upon the notion of self determination: a person should not be able
to assert the rights of others.111 Specifically, an individual must have a personal stake in the
issue before the court and must desire to participate as a party in the judicial process; it is not
appropriate for a third party to seek the benefits of the judicial process on someone else=s behalf.

The justiciability doctrine helps to ensure the fair administration of our judicial system
110

Id. at 306-307 (Similar to class action litigation where a class representative must be a
member of the class to be an effective representative of the class interest, the justiciability
doctrine guarantees that a litigant has a personal stake in the outcome of the issue such that they
will adequately represent others in a similar situation who are not before the court.) There is
some disagreement over the notion that a personal stake is necessary for adequate representation.
See Mark Tushnet, The Sociology of Article III: A Response to Professor Brilmayer, 93 Harv.
Law Review 1698 (1979-80).
111

Id at 310.
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and the consistency of its decisions, allowing only those individuals or entities who meet
standing, ripeness and mootness to avail themselves of the judicial process. Interestingly, it is
precisely the protection afforded by the justiciability requirements that justifies the relatively
free access provided to amicus curiae. While amicus curiae are permitted wide latitude in
offering legal and factual insights to the courts, their role is purely supplemental to the central
role played by the parties. Specifically, amicus curiae are not permitted to initiate a lawsuit or to
participate in most of the strategic decisions in the litigation. Rather, the role of amicus curiae is
limited to providing information to the court regarding issues that have been framed and
presented by the parties. As long as the parties satisfy the requirements of Article III, the
policies underlying justiciability will be guaranteed, regardless of whether amicus curiae offer
supplemental information. 112 Indeed, once the judicial process has been initiated in accordance
with Article III requirements, amicus curiae arguably further the policies of justiciability by
adding to the quality of information upon which the court is able to make a determination. Thus,
to the extent that a permissive policy toward amicus participation improves the quality of
information upon which a court may declare the law, amicus curiae do not pose a serious threat
to the adversarial structure of our judicial system.113

B. Should we be concerned about the quality of information presented by amicus curiae?
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Specifically, the supplemental information offered by amicus will not make the parties
any less capable of representing their own interests or the interests of those individuals who are
not at the table.
113

Mark Tushnet, 93 Harv. Law Review 1698, 1698 (1979-1980)(AWhen judges make
law and scholars propose rules of law, they necessarily rely on their vision of society as it is and
as it might be. If law is to be made well, those visions must be accurate and attractive.@).
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In light of the increasing significance of amicus curiae in federal litigation, it is
imperative to evaluate the quality of information that is being offered and the procedural checks
that exist to ensure a level of reliability. While Justice Breyer has lauded amicus briefs for
performing an important role in educating judges,114 such Aeducation@ is only relevant to the
judicial function if it is based upon reliable information. Professors Rustad and Koenig similarly
recognize the important role that amicus curiae can play in educating judges, but they emphasize
that judges must be cognizant of the fact that not all information presented by amicus curiae will
be equally reliable:
[T]he alternative to admitting social science data is to return to nineteenth century legal
formalism, according to which justices or other powerful groups substitute their own
normative beliefs for scientific findings... Third-party amici providing social science
data can be an important check against governmental abuse of power.... The problem of
integrating social science research into constitutional decision-making is Acomplicated by
the fact that not all social science is created equal@115
In light of the opportunity for amici to present exaggerated, skewed, or unreliable factual
information, courts need a mechanism for distinguishing the reliable information from the
unreliable information. Yet, because amicus briefs are not admitted into evidence, the
information presented in the briefs tends to escape many of the procedural mechanisms that help
to ensure reliability of record evidence. Expert testimony presents an excellent example of how
114

Stephen Breyer, The Interdependence of Science and Law, 82 Judicature 24, 26

(1998).
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Michael Rustad and Thomas Koenig, The Supreme Court and Junk Science: Selective
Distortion in Amicus Briefs, 72 N.C. L. Rev. 91, 158-59 (1991)(Professors Rustad and Koenig
have suggested that reliability concerns regarding information presented by amici could be
mitigated through procedural mechanisms such as the judicial appointment of social science
experts, the creation of special social science courts, or the creation of social science research
agencies.) See also David Faigman, To Have and Have Not: Assessing the Value of Social
Science to the Law as Science and Policy, 38 Emory Law J. 1005, 1081 (1989)(Athe legal
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the rules of procedure and evidence work to shed light on the reliability of other sources of
sophisticated data and information. Specifically, when a party anticipates using an expert to
testify at trial, that expert must provide to the other litigants a report detailing, among other
things, the expert=s credentials, theories, and opinions.116 Moreover, parties are given an
opportunity to depose anyone who has been identified as an expert whose opinions may be
presented at trial.117 By allowing adversaries to become acquainted with expert theories and
qualifications in advance of trial, the parties are better equipped to challenge the weaknesses of
the expert=s information and shed light on alternative conclusions that might be drawn.

relevance of social science research simply cannot be divorced from its scientific credibility@).
116

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 requires any expert who is retained or specially
employed to provide expert testimony to disclose a report including: Aa complete statement of
all opinions to be expressed and the basis and reasons therefor; the data or other information
considered by the witness in forming the opinions; any exhibits to be used as a summary of or
support for the opinions; any exhibits to be used as a summary of or support for the opinions; the
qualifications of the witness, including a list of all publications authored by the witness within
the preceding ten years; the compensation to be paid for the study and testimony; and a listing of
any other cases in which the witness has testified as an expert at trial or by deposition within the
preceding four years.@
117

Fed. R. Civ. P. (b)(4).
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Moreover, at trial the rules of evidence require the court to engage in a rigorous review of the
qualifications that justify calling the witness an expert, and the reliability of the theory upon
which the expert seeks to opine.118
Factual information offered by amicus curiae, on the other hand, is not subject to a high
level of judicial scrutiny (indeed, there are so few procedural checks in place, it is impossible to
decipher a uniform process invoked by judges to review the content of amicus briefs). Of
course, the ultimate check on the reliability of information presented through amicus curiae is
the adversary system itself. Specifically, if an amicus curiae presents information that is
inaccurate or unreliable, one of the parties is able to bring the deficiency to the court=s attention.
If amicus curiae believe that their adversary will effectively police the quality of the information
that they present, the amicus will have an incentive to include the most reliable information. If
on the other hand, the adversaries are not in a position to police the quality of information
presented by amicus, then the incentive to present exaggerated or skewed information may
become tempting.
If we assume that the adversary process is our primary means of scrutinizing the quality
of information presented by amicus curiae, we must consider whether the litigants are given a
fair opportunity to perform this function. Several issues raise potential for concern. First, to the
extent that the parties have unequal resources it is likely that this function will not be adequately
performed. The party with fewer resources will already be stretched to its limits responding to
the demands of litigating against a Goliath, and it may be unrealistic to expect that party to

118

Fed. R. Evid. 702-705.
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adequately police and respond to specialized information offered by amicus curiae who are
sometimes hand picked and solicited by their adversary. Second, in order to perform the
policing function effectively, the parties must have access to the briefs in a timely fashion. Thus,
the briefs must be available to the parties at an early enough stage in the litigation to allow the
parties to digest the information, investigate its reliability, and if necessary, file a response or
identify (and persuade) an amicus curiae to file a response.
C. A New Procedural Structure
While an overwhelming majority of survey respondents favor some role for amicus
curiae in federal litigation, there is disagreement about the limits that should be placed on such
participation and who should police those limits. The Seventh Circuit, for example, has been an
outspoken critic of automatic acceptance of amicus briefs, stating that the decision of whether to
allow an amicus filing is a matter of Ajudicial grace@ and promising to deny permission to file a
brief that fails to offer new legal arguments or factual information.119 Interestingly, while the
Seventh Circuit encourages amicus curiae to offer new legal arguments, the Court of Appeals for
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Voices for Choices v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 339 F.3d at 544(A[t]he judges of this
court will therefore not grant rote permission to file such a brief, and in particular they will deny
permission to file an amicus brief that essentially duplicates a party=s brief.... The reasons for the
policy are several: judges have heavy caseloads and therefore need to minimize extraneous
reading; amicus briefs, often solicited by parties, may be used to make an end run around courtimposed limitations on the length of parties= briefs; the time and other resources required for the
preparation and study of, and response to, amicus briefs drive up the cost of litigation; and the
filing of an amicus brief is often an attempt to inject interest group politics into the federal
appeals process.@) The Seventh Circuit has established a set of guidelines to gage the utility of
amicus briefs, granting permission to file if: (1) the brief presents ideas, arguments, theories,
insights, facts, or data that are not to be found in the parties= briefs; (2) the potential amicus has a
direct interest in another case that may be materially affected by a decision in the pending case;
or (3) the potential amicus has a unique perspective or specific information to assist the court.
Id. at 545.
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the District of Columbia has expressed concern over allowing amicus curiae unlimited power to
offer new arguments.120 In Eldred v. Ashcroft, the court relied upon the Arule of avoidance@ in
refusing to consider a new constitutional argument presented by amicus, noting that the
argument implicated new legal issues that were not raised by the parties.121 In contrast, the Third
Circuit has kept the door wide open for amici, noting that a selective denial of amicus briefs may
create an unwarranted appearance of view point discrimination.122 While each of these courts
has expressed a different concern regarding amicus briefs, their concerns focus on fundamentally
important issues -- party autonomy, neutrality of decision maker, and efficiency.123 The question
that appears to create the disagreement, is not whether we should be concerned about these
issues, but rather, how to protect the important values that are at stake.
Under the current system, governmental amicus curiae are permitted to file a brief
without consent of the parties and without leave of court, while non governmental amicus curiae
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Eldred v. Ashcroft, 255 f.3d 849 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
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Id. at 850-51. The dissenting opinion strongly disagreed with the decision to ignore
the amicus= argument, noting that Athe role of an amicus is to assist the court in addressing the
issues already raised with new arguments and perspectives. ... [In this case], the amicus brief ...
addressed [the] issue more persuasively than did appellants. But amicus did not >expand= the
scope of appeal by >implicating issues= not raised by the appellant.@ Id. at 852. But see Teague
v. Lane 489 US 288, 300, 330 (1989)(stating court was free to address issue raised only in
amicus brief).
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Neonatology Assoc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 293 F.3d 128, 132 (3d. Cir.
2002)(questioning whether the court is able to appropriately weigh the value of the briefs at an
early stage in the litigation).
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Specifically, the Seventh Circuit has expressed concern about efficiency and sought to
avoid needless duplicity, the D.C. Circuit has sought to protect party autonomy by prohibiting
amici from injecting new legal issues into the litigation and the Third Circuit has raised concerns
about the appearance of bias that may arise from selective rejection of briefs.
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may file a brief if: (1) the parties consent to the filing; or (2) the court grants leave to file.124
Pursuant to this rule, courts have tended to grant leave to virtually all amicus briefs submitted,
avoiding a premature judgment on the content of the briefs, but leaving the door open for
duplicitous briefs that undercut efficiency.125 This open door policy makes sense when one
considers that in order to police the briefs for duplicitous content, the courts would have to read
them all B thus imposing the very burden that the court seeks to avoid. One way to resolve this
quandary, is to rely more heavily upon the adversary process to police the content of amicus
briefs and preserve the court=s role for limited instances where the parties are unable to resolve
their differences.
Traditionally, amicus curiae were neutral players who submitted information to assist the
court -- so called Afriends of the court.@ The value of an amicus brief was derived from the fact
that the information offered was provided from a neutral perspective, not in support of one side
or the other. Today, however, amicus curiae are not neutral players in the litigation. It is
accepted practice for amicus curiae to support a party, indeed the rules require the cover of the
amicus brief to identify the party or parties supported by the brief.126 Moreover, litigants are
quite strategic about the process of soliciting and managing amicus participation.127 For
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Sup. Ct. Rule 37(2) and (3); Fed. R. App. P. 29(a).
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The secondary effect of an open door policy is that litigants are unlikely to refuse
consent when they know that the court is very likely to grant permission to file.
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Sup Ct. Rule 37(2); Fed. R. App. P. 29(b).
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See 55 Case Western Reserve 667, 674 (2005)(AParties often solicit amicus support as
another weapon in the adversarial struggle.@); see also, Glassroth v. Moore, 347 F.3d 916, 919
(commenting upon the amount of time counsel spent seeking amici support); Voices for Choices,
339 F.3d 542, 544 (7th Cir. 2003).
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example, a recent article in the Legal Times described a fee dispute in a high profile case before
the Supreme Court. The dispute resulted in papers being filed that Ashed a rare behind-thescenes light on how war is waged in high-stakes Supreme Court Court litigation.@ These
documents indicated that Kenneth Starr devoted 58 hours, at $750 an hour, attempting to Asecure
an amicus curiae brief from then-acting Solicitor General Paul Clement, or at least to keep him
from supporting [the other side]@ in the dispute.128 To the extent that litigants often orchestrate
amicus activity, the rules of procedure should recognize this reality and place the formal
responsibility for coordinating amici squarely on the parties= shoulders.
Unlike the court, parties are often aware of the arguments that supportive amicus curiae
will present, either because they have solicited their participation or because the amicus has
reached out and contacted the party regarding the litigation. Thus, the parties are in a better
position than the court to shoulder the responsibility of ensuring that the information presented
educates the court on a relevant issue that has not already been brought to the court=s attention.
Similar to the discovery rules which encourage the early exchange of factual information among
litigants, the rules should require every party to provide to every other party information
regarding amicus activity. Specifically, every entity desiring to participate as amicus curiae
should be required to prepare and sign a written report similar to the expert report required by
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B). This report would describe the amicus= interest in the litigation,
identify the party supported, outline the information/legal arguments to be presented, and
provide information relating to the amicus= credibility (ie. scholarly articles written by the
amicus, other litigation involving the same issue(s) in which the amicus has participated as a
128

Grapes of Wrath at the High Court, Tony Mauro, Legal Times (April 14, 2006).
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party or amicus, compensation by a party for amicus participation, facts relating to any
relationship that exists between the amicus and the party supported, etc.). Such reports should be
prepared by the amicus, provided to the litigant supported by the amicus, and then given by the
litigant to all other parties to the suit and filed with the court. These reports should be provided
at a relatively early stage in the litigation, thus providing a better opportunity for parties to
evaluate the quality of information presented by amici and increase the chances that the
adversary process will successfully identify inaccurate, skewed, or irrelevant information.129
The amicus reports would not significantly change the procedure for rebutting
information offered by amicus curiae, but rather would empower the adversaries to more
efficiently police the amicus process. The early exchange of amicus reports will facilitate all
parties, but the reports will provide significant support to parties with limited resources. Rather
than allowing an adversary to swamp an opposing party (particularly tempting when one party
has fewer resources), the amicus report(s) will provide timely notice of the quantity of briefs that
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The most recent amendments to the Supreme Court Rules are consistent with the
procedural structure suggested herein but do not go far enough. Specifically, on June 25, 2007,
the Supreme Court adopted amendments to Rule 37 which require amicus curiae to serve a
notice of intent to file a brief prior to actually filing the brief, impose earlier deadlines for filing
amicus briefs which seek to allow a responding party more time to respond to the amicus curiae,
and require notification if a party or counsel to a party Ais a member of the amicus curiae, or
made a monetary contribution to the preparation or submission of the brief.@ Rules of the
Supreme Court of the United States, Rule 37.2(a), 37.6 (amended June 25, 2007).
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can be expected, outline the arguments to be presented and provide adversaries with relevant
background information concerning the identity and credibility of the amicus curiae. The reports
provide a natural disincentive to “me too” briefs because redundancy of the briefs will be readily
identifiable from the argument outlines. Moreover, early notice of the arguments to be presented
will facilitate the identification of skewed or unreliable information and provide a more even
playing field to respond. Overall, the exchange of amicus reports will allow parties to
communicate and negotiate regarding amicus curiae, thus making the adversaries the primary
gatekeepers for amicus activity. If the parties are unable to resolve their differences, parties may
withhold consent to file the brief and inform the court of the perceived defects in the proposed
filing. If the amicus is permitted to file notwithstanding a party’s objection, the party may then
rebut the assertions of the amicus in its own brief or solicit an amicus to offer rebuttal insights.
The procedure set forth in this paper provides the parties with more information to make these
decisions and shifts the primary burden of policing the amicus process onto the adversaries.
V. Conclusion:
The analysis presented in this paper suggests that amicus curiae often play an important
role in federal litigation. Yet, the current attitude allowing virtually unchecked access to file
amicus briefs, creates a very real threat to the efficient adjudication of cases. AMe too@ briefs
which merely repeat arguments that have already been fully vetted and briefs containing skewed
or unreliable information offer no significant utility to the court, while briefs that educate the
court on complex technical matters or inform the court of potential impacts of a decision on non
parties offer valuable insights to the decision making process. This article suggests that the
current procedural regime places too heavy a burden on the courts to ferret out the wheat from
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the chaff, thus leading many courts to freely admit virtually every amicus brief that is offered.
In light of the practical reality that litigants often solicit, coordinate, manage and orchestrate
supporting amicus briefs, this article suggests that the procedural system should openly
acknowledge this activity and place more responsibility for policing the content of amicus briefs
on the parties. Specifically, the rules of procedure should require early exchange of information
regarding each litigant=s intended amicus activity. This information would extend beyond
merely identifying the amicus curiae, to include background information regarding the amicus
and its interest in the litigation (such information might resemble the information required in an
expert report under F.R.C.P 26) as well as an outline of the arguments and/or information that
will be contained in the brief. An early exchange of this information would allow the litigants to
identify attempts to inundate the court with Ame to@ briefs, thus allowing them to pressure their
adversary to avoid such duplicity. It would also allow litigants more time to evaluate the
reliability of adverse amicus briefs and prepare an appropriate response.
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